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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
c a s e  n o . 08-61826-CIV-ROSENBAUM
Ba r b a r a  l a w s o n ,
Plaintiff,
vs.




This matter is before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion 
for Summary Judgment”). [D.E. 31, 32]. The Court has carefully considered the Motion, 
Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [D.E. 33], Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment [D.E. 48], Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Dispute [D.E. 49], and 
Defendant’s Reply [D.E. 57], as well as the attached exhibits, deposition transcripts, and affidavits 
of various witnesses in this case. After a full review, the Court finds that Defendant’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
On November 12, 2008, Defendant Plantation General Hospital, L.P., (“Defendant”)1 filed 
its Notice of Removal [D.E. 1] with the Court. In its Notice, Defendant indicated that Plaintiff 
Barbara Lawson (“Plaintiff” or “Lawson”), had filed an action in the Circuit Court of the 
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit. Defendant asserted that this Court has original jurisdiction over the 
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the Complaint sets forth facts which, if  true, would
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constitute a violation of federal law. Indeed, the Complaint alleges violations of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, et seq., the Family 
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq., the Americans With Disabilities Act of 
1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. The Complaint also sets forth various claims under the Florida 
Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) stemming from allegations of discrimination due to Plaintiff’s race, age, 
handicap, national origin, and gender.
Plaintiff is a Black Jamaican female who suffers from sickle cell disease2 and who was 
formerly employed by Defendant as an executive secretary in the Administrative Offices of the 
Hospital. Plaintiff claims that following a sickle cell crisis that required hospitalization and then bed 
rest, Defendant involuntarily transferred Plaintiff to another position in the Hospital -  as Medical 
Staff Administrative Assistant. Plaintiff contends that the transfer constituted a demotion and asserts 
that a less qualified, younger Hispanic male, Miguel Cruz, was promoted to her former executive 
secretary position. Following this transfer and an allegedly unfair evaluation of Plaintiff, Defendant 
terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s actions were discriminatory 
and were made in retaliation for Plaintiff’s taking of FMLA leave. Defendant responds that it did 
not discriminate or retaliate against Plaintiff and that it had legitimate non-discriminatory and non­
retaliatory reasons for its actions. Defendant also emphasizes that Plaintiff’s termination was based 
upon a reduction in force (“RIF”).
2 Sickle cell disease is an inherited blood disorder that affects the blood cells. People 
with sickle cell disease have red blood cells that contain mostly hemoglobin*S, an abnormal type 
of hemoglobin. Sometimes the red blood cells become sickle-shaped and block small blood 
vessels, causing less blood to reach that part of the body. Tissue that does not receive normal 
blood flow eventually becomes damaged. See www.sicklecelldisease.org
2
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MATERIAL FACTS3
The Court notes that it must take the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,4 but sets 
forth the events from each party’s perspective so that it may establish a complete picture of the 
parties’ positions. Plaintiff is a Black female of Jamaican descent who suffers from sickle cell 
disease and who was fifty-eight years old at the time of the filing of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. In September of 1995, Defendant hired Plaintiff to work as an executive secretary in the 
Hospital’s Administrative Offices, where she worked with the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), 
the Chief Operations Officer (“COO”), and the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”). Plaintiff served 
as the Hospital’s Executive Secretary in Administration until February of 2007, when the Hospital 
transferred Plaintiff to its Medical Staff Office. When Plaintiff first began serving as the Executive 
Secretary in Administration, she reported to Pat Johnsen (“Johnsen”), Administrative Assistant to 
the CEO. Sometime after 1997, Plaintiff began reporting to David Hughes (“Hughes”), who was 
the CFO at the time.
After Hughes left the Hospital in December of 2005, Elizabeth Izquierdo (“Izquierdo”), a 
younger Hispanic female, became the Hospital’s new CFO. From late 2005 until late January of 
2007, Plaintiff worked directly for Izquierdo and indirectly for the COO, Shana Sappington 
(“Sappington”). At that time, Johnsen also worked in the Administrative Office with Plaintiff, where 
Johnsen served as an administrative assistant to Sappington and the CEO Barbara Simmons
3 The Court has set forth the material facts based upon its review and consideration of 
Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [D.E. 33], Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed 
Material Facts [D.E. 49], and affidavits and deposition transcripts of the various witnesses in this 
case, including any attached exhibits. The Court further notes that pursuant to Local Rule 7.5.D, 
all material facts set forth in Defendant’s statement and supported by evidence of record are 
deemed admitted unless controverted by Plaintiff’s statement.
4 See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).
3
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(“Simmons”). Thus, the Administrative Office was comprised of Izquierdo, Sappinton, Simmons, 
and their two support staff -  Plaintiff and Johnsen.
In her role as Executive Secretary in Administration, Plaintiff performed administrative 
duties for committees that were chaired by the CFO. Although Plaintiff assisted with other 
committees, the Ethics and Compliance Committee accounted for approximately 25% of Plaintiff’s 
work. Plaintiff also answered phones, scheduled meetings, filed, and performed clerical tasks, 
among other work.5 Plaintiff received consistently good performance reviews as well as pay raises 
each year that she performed her duties as Executive Secretary in Administration.
As noted previously, Plaintiff suffers from sickle cell disease, a permanent condition with 
which she was first diagnosed in 1972. Plaintiff asserts that sickle cell disease is a qualifying 
disability under the ADA and FCRA or, alternatively, that Defendant knew about the condition and 
perceived the disease to be a disability, or that she had a record of disability. Defendant disagrees 
that Plaintiff’s sickle cell disease qualifies her as disabled under the ADA and FCRA. During 
Plaintiff’s twelve years of employment at the Hospital, Plaintiff suffered at least five major sickle 
cell crises -  in 1998, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2006.6 All of the crises required hospitalization, during 
which Plaintiff received oxygen and pain medication, followed by bed rest. In addition to these 
crises, Plaintiff experienced non-major crises that required bed rest and prescription medication.
5 As noted in the Hospital’s Position Description for Executive Secretary, Lawson 
served “as the primary source of administrative and clerical support for the assigned executive 
hospital position, under the general administrative guidance of the Administrative Assistant.”
The goals of the position included efficient scheduling of meetings and appointments; effective 
communication with colleagues, doctors, staff, and patients; following up with department 
managers on the status of projects; preparing written correspondence; managing and simplifying 
the flow of documents; and the effective management of schedules and priorities.
6 The Hospital (including Izquierdo) was aware that Plaintiff suffers from sickle cell 
disease.
4
Case 0:08-cv-61826-RSR Document 95 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/30/10 17:21:49 Page 5
of 52
Plaintiff states that she receives ongoing treatment for her sickle cell disease. Plaintiff takes 
folic acid and multiple vitamins on a daily basis for her sickle cell disease, and her primary care 
physician, Dr. Richard McClean (“McClean”), prescribed Darvocet for Plaintiff to take when she 
feels a sickle cell crisis coming on. Plaintiff also asserts that she has been prescribed Plavix, HCT2 
(hydroshlorothiazide), Amlodipine for hypertension, Metaprolol for angina, and Protonix for hiatial 
hernia. Many of Plaintiff’s conditions are complications of her sickle cell disease.
Plaintiff has a treating hematologist, Dr. Jolly Varki (“Dr. Varki”), whom Plaintiff sees 
approximately every six months. Although Dr. Varki’s records reflect extended periods of time 
during which Plaintiff is without significant symptoms, the records also reveal that Plaintiff suffers 
weakness, weight loss, and shortness of breath. Plaintiff indicates that she experiences joint/muscle 
weakness and fatigue on a daily basis. Plaintiff also states that she suffers from chronic anemia, her 
gall bladder has been removed, and she has a heart murmur, gout, an enlarged spleen, and elevated 
bilirubin, which she asserts are all complications of sickle cell disease. Plaintiff also notes that she 
had a stroke and continues to suffer from hypertension. In connection with her sickle cell disease, 
Plaintiff indicates that she must avoid stress, cannot engage in extreme physical activity such as 
running, and is not able to care for herself when she has a major crisis. Defendant, on the other 
hand, emphasizes that Plaintiff can care for herself, perform daily tasks, and work on a full time 
basis.
Plaintiff’s last major sickle cell crisis occurred in December of 2006, when she worked for 
Izquierdo. During this major crisis, Plaintiff was hospitalized for ten days and then ordered to bed 
rest for an additional period of time before returning to work on January 15, 2007. As a result of the 
major crisis, Plaintiff requested and was granted FMLA leave. Plaintiff claims that this is the only 
time that she officially applied for FMLA leave, but Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has never been
5
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denied request for time off as a result of her illness. Both parties agree that Plaintiff has been able 
to work since her return to work on January 15, 2007, through April 2, 2009 (the date of her 
deposition).
Following Plaintiff’s FMLA leave in December of 2006, she returned to her position as 
Executive Secretary in Administration on January 15, 2007. According to Plaintiff, within days of 
returning to work, Izquierdo transferred Plaintiff to another unit in the Hospital. Hospital documents 
reflect that effective February 4, 2007, Plaintiff was transferred from Executive Secretary in 
Administration to a new position as Administrative Assistant in the Hospital’s Medical Staff Office. 
At the same time, Miguel Cruz (“Cruz”), a younger Hispanic male, was transferred from 
Administrative Assistant in the Medical Staff Office to Executive Secretary in Administration. 
Defendant claims, however, that Plaintiff’s Executive Secretary position was eliminated and when 
Cruz transferred into Administration, a new position was created which included Plaintiff’s former 
job responsibilities and the additional responsibility of handling physician contracts.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s transfer was based on legitimate business reasons. 
According to CFO Izquierdo, her duties included, among other things, auditing various physician 
contracts. Prior to Izquierdo’s appointment as CFO, the physician contracts were handled by 
Plaintiff’s co-worker Johnsen. After Izquiredo became the CFO, however, Cruz handled this task 
as part of his duties as Administrative Assistant in the Medical Staff Office. Izquierdo began 
working on the physician contracts with Cruz while he was assigned to Medical Staff and, although 
she was satisfied with Cruz’s work on the contracts, Izquierdo claims that she wanted the contracts 
to be handled directly in the Hospital’s Administrative Offices. Accordingly, at a weekly 
Administrative Staff Meeting, Izquierdo proposed that Cruz be transferred into Administration as 
an Executive Secretary who would also handle physician contracts and that Plaintiff be transferred
6
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in his place to the Medical Staff Office as an Administrative Assistant, Simmons, the acting CEO, 
approved the decision to transfer both Plaintiff and Cruz, Izquierdo admits that she never considered 
whether Plaintiff could perform the physician contract work,7
Hospital documents reflect that, upon his transfer to the Executive Secretary position, Cruz 
received a merit raise and promotion, Specifically, Cruz received over a 10% pay increase once the 
transfer became final, Upon her transfer, Plaintiff retained the same pay, benefits, and schedule as 
when she was an Executive Secretary, but her title changed to Administrative Assistant,8 In her new 
position, Plaintiff kept her administrative responsibilities for the Ethics and Compliance Committee, 
but not for other committees with which she had previously worked, According to Plaintiff, the 
duties of the Executive Secretary in Administration required more analytical and interpretive skills, 
writing, speaking, and interpersonal skills such that a transfer from Administration to another 
department was perceived as a demotion, Defendant disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention,
Following Plaintiff’s transfer to the Medical Staff Office, she reported to Laurie Rodriguez 
(“Rodriguez”), the manager of the Medical Staff Office who, in turn, reported to Laurie Meyer 
(“Meyer”), the director of Medical Staff and Health Information Services, Meyer reported directly 
to Izquierdo, Other employees in the Medical Staff unit included Marisel Grana (“Grana”), the 
credentials coordinator, and Laurie Evans (“Evans”), a part-time medical staff coordinator who was 
hired after Plaintiff’s transfer, The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was not happy with the
7 Plaintiff contends that earlier in her career at the Hospital, she handled physician 
contracts, including preparing and auditing the contracts,
8 As noted in the Hospital’s Position Description for Administrative Assistant in 
Medical Staff, “the position provides administrative support to [the] Director,” The Assistant 
also performs clerical tasks and coordinates department functions, The position includes the 
“primary responsibility for ordering supplies, office filing system, daily correspondence and 
communications,”
7
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transfer.
In March of 2007, just after her transfer, Plaintiff received her annual evaluation for the 
calendar year o f2006, which reflected Plaintiff’s performance as Executive Secretary, Although the 
evaluation was prepared by Izquierdo and Sappington, Izquierdo had been out on maternity leave 
from May o f2006 through August or September o f2006, and in her absence, Sappington served as 
Plaintiff’s supervisor, The March, 2007, evaluation indicated that Plaintiff had performed well in 
her role as Executive Secretary, The parties agree that Plaintiff received a pay increase shortly 
thereafter, but Defendant contends that the raise was made in connection with the March, 2007, 
evaluation, and Plaintiff claims that the pay increase resulted from an adjustment in the range of her 
pay by Human Resources,
Plaintiff worked in her new role in Medical Staff from early February of 2007 until she was 
terminated nine months later on October 19, 2007, Although the parties do not dispute this fact, they 
do debate greatly Plaintiff’s job function while in Medical Staff, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s 
duties were essentially the same as before her transfer -  she provided administrative support to the 
office, performed clerical tasks, ordered supplies, filed, and handled correspondence and 
communications, In this regard, Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiff continued to perform her 
administrative responsibilities for the Hospital’s Ethics and Compliance Committee,
Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that she spent the majority of her time filing in Medical 
Staff and did not prepare correspondence as she had done in Administration, And, although Plaintiff 
acknowledges that she continued to work on the Ethics and Compliance Committee, she states that 
she no longer performed administrative duties for the other committees with which she had 
previously worked,
In early July of 2007, Rodriguez and Meyer met with Plaintiff and presented her with a 90-
8
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Day Evaluation (“the Evaluation”) with respect to her performance in the Medical Staff Office. The 
Evaluation indicated that Plaintiff met expectations in many areas, but also rated Plaintiff as 
inconsistent in other areas. For example, one of the criticisms listed in the Evaluation stated that 
Plaintiff showed an unwillingness to assist Izquierdo in completing meeting minutes for the Ethics 
and Compliance Committee. According to Plaintiff, the inclusion of this criticism reveals that 
Meyer consulted with Izquierdo prior to issuing the Evaluation. At this time, Rodriguez and Meyer 
provided Plaintiff with a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) that set forth the areas in which 
Plaintiff needed to improve and asked Plaintiff to prepare a response that would map out Plaintiff’s 
plan to address each area of perceived deficiency. Plaintiff felt that the evaluation and PIP were 
unfair, not reflective of her j ob performance, and completely contrary to all other evaluations she had 
received while employed at the Hospital. Plaintiff also emphasizes that during this same time frame, 
Rodriguez told Plaintiff that Rodriguez was asked to “find stuff to write about [Plaintiff].”
Plaintiff drafted and submitted various versions of her response to the PIP, with the first two 
responses being deemed insufficient. Indeed, after Plaintiff submitted her first response, the Vice 
President of Human Resources, Ben Bittner (“Bittner”), met with Plaintiff to discuss the PIP and 
Plaintiff’s response. During the meeting, at which Rodriguez and Meyer were also present, Bittner 
asked Plaintiff to go back and attempt to further develop her response. Sensing Plaintiff’s frustration 
with her new position and performance evaluation, as an alternative to continuing her employment 
in the Medical Staff unit, Bittner offered Plaintiff a severance package. Plaintiff, however, 
responded that she did not wish to accept a severance package. Subsequently, Plaintiff drafted a 
revision to her response, which was also deemed unsatisfactory, but then provided a final response 
to the PIP dated August 23, 2007, which Bittner deemed to be sufficient. After Plaintiff submitted 
her final response, her supervisors noted that Plaintiff’s performance had improved.
9
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Less than two months later, on October 19, 2007, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s 
employment, at which time Bittner explained to Plaintiff that her position had been eliminated as a 
result of a reduction in force (“RIF”). Defendant set Plaintiff’s effective date of termination as 
November 2, 2007, which allowed Plaintiff to enjoy the continuation of benefits through the end of 
November. Plaintiff also received twelve weeks of severance pay.
Although the parties agree that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated, they dispute the 
reasons for the termination. Defendant claims that in the fall of 2007, the Hospital’s East Florida 
Division Office directed the CEO, CFO, and COO to reduce its workforce by either five or six full­
time employees. Izquierdo stated that this reduction was necessitated by budgetary concerns and a 
drop in patient census. According to Defendant, the Administration (Izquierdo, Sappington, and 
Simmons) reviewed each department to determine which was over-staffed or under-staffed, and then 
the Administration met with Bittner to discuss each individual identified for termination. The team 
determined that Plaintiff’s duties in Medical Staff could be allocated to the other two employees in 
that unit (i.e., Grana and Evans). Defendant asserts that both Grana and Evans were capable of 
carrying out the clerical duties of Plaintiff’s position, but that Plaintiff had not been trained in the 
job functions of Grana and Evans’s positions; hence, her position could be eliminated. Defendant 
contends that Plaintiff s position was eliminated, that no one replaced her, and that no other positions 
in the office were available at the time of her elimination.
Plaintiff disputes that her termination resulted from a RIF and asserts that the reason given 
by Defendant was a pretext for discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff points to the fact that four 
other individuals were terminated along with Plaintiff and that three of the five employees were 
Black and none were Hispanic. Additionally, Plaintiff emphasizes that four of the five individuals 
terminated were substantially over the age of forty, and four had taken FMLA leave more than once
10
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within the prior two years. Also significant to Plaintiff is the fact that those who allegedly took over 
Plaintiff’s duties (Grana and Evans) are non-Black employees who are substantially younger than 
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff further notes that the utilization reports upon which Defendant claimed it relied to 
impose the RIF, do not support the elimination of Plaintiff’s position because the reports reveal that 
Medical Staff was not over-staffed. Instead, Plaintiff notes that the September 30, 2007, report 
reveals that while the target hours for the department were 618 hours, the actual hours used 
amounted to only 595.25. Likewise, the utilization report for October 31,2007, shows that the target 
hours for Medical Staff was 662.40 and the actual hours used totaled 589.75. Plaintiff also 
emphasizes that the November, 2007, utilization report shows that the target hours of Medical Staff 
were lowered to 457.60 hours, while the target hours for other departments with reduced positions 
remained approximately the same. Plaintiff further states that at the time that her position was 
eliminated, the Hospital was hiring for other positions, but Plaintiff was not offered another position. 
Finally, although Cruz later resigned his employment with the Hospital in December of 2007 (two 
months after Plaintiff’s termination) and Defendant advertised the Executive Secretary position as 
vacant, it did not contact Plaintiff to fill the position.
ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if  the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials 
on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Not any factual dispute 
will defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue 
of material fact.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (emphasis in original). An issue is
11
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genuine if  “a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party,” Miccosukee 
Tribe o f Indians o f Fla. v. U.S., 516 F,3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir, 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc,, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)), A fact is material if  “it would affect the outcome of the 
suit under the governing law , , , ,” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S, at 247-48),
Following a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and 
resolves all reasonable doubts against the movant, Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F,3d 1188 (11th Cir, 2002); 
Johnson v. City o f Mobile, 321 F, App’x 826, 830 (11th Cir, 2009), Further, the Court will not 
weigh conflicting evidence, Skop v. City o f Atlanta, 485 F,3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir, 2007), reh ’g and 
reh’g en banc denied, 254 F, App’x 803 (11th Cir, 2007), Thus, upon discovering a genuine dispute, 
the Court promptly will deny summary judgment, Id.
The moving party shoulders the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact, Shiver v. Chertoff 549 F,3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir, 2008), Once the moving party 
satisfies this burden, “the nonmoving party ‘must do more than simply show that there is some 
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’” Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 327 F, App’x 819, 
825 (11th Cir, 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U,S, 574, 
587 (1986)), Instead, “the non-moving party ‘must make a sufficient showing on each essential 
element of the case for which he has the burden of proof,’” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U,S, 317, 322 (1986)), Accordingly, the non-moving party must produce evidence, going 
beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, designate specific facts suggesting that a reasonable jury could find in his favor, 
Shiver, 549 F,3d at 1343,
12
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B. The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Analysis
Here, where no direct evidence9 of discrimination exists, Plaintiff may establish her prima 
facie claims of discrimination and retaliation through circumstantial evidence. In evaluating whether 
a plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation through the use of 
circumstantial evidence, the Eleventh Circuit has applied the burden-shifting approach articulated 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, a plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, 
which creates a presumption that the employer discriminated or retaliated against her. Curtis v. 
Broward County, 292 F. App’x 882, 883 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Brooks v. County Comm’n o f 
Jefferson County, Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006)); Holifieldv. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555 (11th 
Cir. 1997).
Where the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, the burden 
shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory (or non­
retaliatory) reason for the challenged adverse employment action, which rebuts the presumption of 
discrimination (or retaliation). Id. at 1564, Pennington v. City o f Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 
(11th Cir. 2001) (citing Olmsteadv. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 1998)); Brown
9 The Eleventh Circuit has held that direct evidence of discrimination is “evidence, 
that, if  believed, proves [the] existence of [a] fact without inference or presumption.” Kilpatrick 
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 268 F. App’x 860, 861-62 (11th Cir. 2008). Such direct evidence reflects “a 
discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or retaliation complained of 
by the employee,” and must indicate that the adverse employment decision was motivated by the 
decision-maker’s intent to discriminate. Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets o f Florida, Inc., 196 
F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1109 (2000) (quoting Carter v.
Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998)). As a result, “[o]nly 
the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of 
a protected classification, constitute direct evidence.” Kilpatrick, 268 F. App’x at 862.
13
v. Chertoff, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1378 (S.D. Ga. 2008). If the defendant meets this burden of 
production, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s proffered 
reasons are merely pretext for the employer’s discriminatory and retaliatory actions. Id. In other 
words, Plaintiff must come forward with evidence “sufficient to permit a reasonable fact finder to 
conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons” for the employment 
action. Perrero v. Spectacor Mgmt. Group, 308 F. App’x 327, 329 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Chapman v. A.I. Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000)).
C. Plaintiff’s FMLA Retaliation Claim
______ The FMLA provides an eligible employee up to a total of twelve weeks of unpaid leave in
any one-year period “[bjecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to 
perform the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a); Parris v. Miami 
Herald Publishing Co., 216 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000). The FMLA creates two types of 
claims: interference claims, in which the employee asserts that his employer denied or otherwise 
interfered with his substantive rights, and retaliation claims, in which the employee contends that 
her employer discriminated against her because she engaged in a protected activity. 29 U.S.C. § 
2615(a)(1) and (2); Martin v. Brevard County Public Schools, 543 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2008); 
Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care System, Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006); Wascura v.
City o f South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2001).
In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts only a claim for FMLA retaliation. To successfully make 
a claim for FMLA retaliation, Plaintiff must demonstrate the following: (1) she engaged in 
statutorily protected conduct; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal 
connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Martin, 543
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F.3d at 1268; Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1297. Where Plaintiff establishes a retaliation case without 
direct evidence of the employer’s retaliatory intent, the burden-shifting framework set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas applies. Martin, 543 F.3d at 1268.
In this case, no dispute exists that Plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected activity by taking 
medical leave pursuant to the FMLA. Hence, Defendant concedes for purposes of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment that the first prong of Plaintiff’sprima facie case is met. Defendant claims that 
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails, however, because Plaintiff cannot show that she suffered an adverse 
employment action and cannot demonstrate a causal connection between any alleged adverse 
employment action and her medical leave.
1. Adverse Employment Action
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s transfer to the Medical Staff Office was not an adverse 
action because the job reassignment was not material and significant, but rather, was a lateral 
transfer. According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s position in Medical Staff was virtually the same as her 
prior job as an Executive Secretary in Administration. Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiff retained 
the same pay, benefits, schedule, and hours. Plaintiff also retained her responsibilities with respect 
to the Hospital’s Ethics and Compliance Committee. Defendant argues that transfers are not 
considered materially adverse where the plaintiff produces no objective evidence to support a loss 
of prestige. Because Plaintiff cannot show an adverse employment action, Defendant contends that 
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim must fail.
Plaintiff disagrees and contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether 
Plaintiff’s transfer constituted a demotion or adverse employment action. In this respect, Plaintiff 
points out that Cruz’s transfer from Medical Staff to Executive Secretary in Administration came
15
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with a considerable raise, and the Hospital referred to the transfer as a “promotion,” Additionally, 
Plaintiff argues that reassignment of job duties can be considered an adverse employment action 
when the new responsibilities fall within the same job description, In support of this position, 
Plaintiff cites to Doe v. Dekalb County SchoolDist., 145 F,3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir, 1998), in which 
the Eleventh Circuit stated, “Where a plaintiff has allegedly suffered termination, demotion, 
reduction in pay, loss of prestige, or diminishment in responsibilities , , , a court normally has no 
cause to consider its standard for adversity; the relevant question is whether such potentially adverse 
actions took place,” Based on Doe, Plaintiff asserts that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
whether Plaintiff suffered a loss of prestige or diminishment of responsibilities sufficient to 
constitute an adverse employment action, According to Plaintiff, a perception at the Hospital existed 
that being transferred from Administration to another department was a demotion and that Plaintiff’s 
prior duties in Administration required more skill than her new Medical Staff position, Finally, 
Plaintiff emphasizes that although the Hospital allowed her to continue her work with the Ethics and 
Compliance Committee, she had also been previously responsible for the administration of other 
committees,
The Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff’s transfer 
from Administration to Medical Staff constitutes an adverse employment action, Eleventh Circuit 
precedent makes it clear that acts other than ‘ultimate employment actions” (i.e., termination) may 
constitute adverse employment actions, Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc,, 141 F,3d 1453, 1456 
(citing demotions, disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted 
negative job evaluations as examples of adverse employment actions), As noted by both parties, 
reassignment of job duties is not automatically actionable, but depends instead upon the
16
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circumstances of the particular case and “should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable 
person in plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the circumstances. Burlington v. Northern and Santa 
Fe Railway Co v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 71 (2006) (citations omitted).
Here, a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s position could regard the transfer as adverse. 
Although Plaintiff did not suffer a reduction in pay and her work assignment was similar to that of 
her prior position, it was not the same. Indeed, Plaintiff testified during her deposition that she 
devoted approximately 25 percent of her time to the Ethics and Compliance Committee when she 
was in Administration, and yet when she transferred to Medical Staff, she spent about 15 percent of 
her time in this role. Plaintiff also emphasized that Ethics and Compliance was just one of the 
committees that she handled. Overall, the committees to which she devoted her time in 
Administration comprised about 80 percent of her work duties. Although Defendant notes that 
Plaintiff continued to work with the Ethics and Compliance Committee, it fails to acknowledge that 
her work with other committees did not follow Plaintiff to her new position. It appears that 
Plaintiff’s role with respect to the administration of various committees changed dramatically when 
it went from 80% of her work duties to 15%.
This case differs significantly from Polite v. Dougherty County School System, 314 Fed. 
App’x 180 (11th Cir. 2008), a case in which a teacher was transferred to a different school after 
complaining about alleged discriminatory hiring practices. In Polite, the Court found that the 
plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action because his teaching job after the transfer involved 
the same responsibilities and the same pay. Id. at 183-184. Although Defendant likens the facts of 
Polite to this case, the Court disagrees. As noted above, Plaintiff did not retain all of her 
responsibilities after her transfer to Medical Staff. At a minimum, Plaintiff stopped working with
17
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many of the committees on which she had worked previously. Plaintiff’s role also changed in that 
she no longer worked with the executives in Administration. These facts distinguish this case from 
Polite.
Additionally, the Court notes that Cruz received a pay raise when he transferred into 
Administration. Significantly, the Hospital regarded Cruz’s change in position as a “promotion,” 
as noted on his transfer form. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant argues that transfers 
are not materially adverse where a plaintiff produces no objective evidence to support a loss of 
prestige argument. Further, Defendant contends that although Plaintiff may have subjectively 
believed that she was transferred to a less prestigious position, this belief alone fails to meet the 
reasonable person standard set forth in Burlington. While the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s belief 
alone may not meet the reasonable person standard set forth in Burlington, the Hospital’s view of 
Cruz’s transfer as a “promotion” provides support for Plaintiff’s argument that the position in 
Administration was regarded by the Hospital as a more desirable position. And, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in Burlington, an adverse action may exist where a transfer occurs and a plaintiff’s 
prior job was more prestigious. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 71-72.
The Court also agrees with Plaintiff that Deprado v. City o f Miami, 264 Fed. App’x 769 (11th 
Cir. 2008), cited by Defendant, is distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Deprado, a police 
officer claimed that the city retaliated by transferring him to a different unit after he had engaged in 
activity protected by the First Amendment. The Court found that the transfer did not amount to an 
adverse action because the plaintiff “offered no evidence that the Patrol Unit position was more 
arduous or required more qualifications, or that anyone besides [plaintiff] objectively considered it 
a better job.” Id. at 772. In contrast, the instant matter involves a situation where there is evidence
18
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that the Hospital itself regarded the transfer to Administration as a promotion. Thus, evidence exists 
in this case that suggests that someone besides Plaintiff considered her prior job to be more 
prestigious. For these reasons, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
whether Plaintiff’s transfer from Administration to Medical Staff constitutes an adverse action.
Moreover, although the parties do not emphasize it in their briefs, the Hospital ultimately 
terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Obviously, this constitutes an adverse employment action.
2. Causal Connection
Defendant next contends that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim must fail because, even assuming 
that an adverse employment action took place, no causal connection exists between the protected 
activity (i.e., the FMLA leave) and the adverse action. In this regard, Defendant points out that 
Plaintiff’s termination occurred nine months after her FMLA leave ended, which was eight months 
after her transfer to Medical Staff. Defendant asserts that this lapse of time is too great to allow an 
inference of unlawful retaliation. Consequently, Defendant seeks for the Court to enter summary 
judgment against Plaintiff on her retaliation claim because she cannot show a close temporal 
proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that close temporal proximity is not the only way to prove 
causation in a retaliation case. In this matter, Plaintiff points to additional evidence such as the fact 
that other employees who had taken FMLA leave were terminated at the same time as Plaintiff. 
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that her FMLA leave and termination are temporally connected by a 
chain of intervening retaliatory acts such that a causal connection is established. For instance, 
Plaintiff emphasizes that she returned from FMLA leave on January 15, 2007, and her transfer to 
Medical Staff became effective on February 4, 2007 -  a mere two weeks later. Next, at her three-
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month performance review, Plaintiff received unfavorable comments in several areas of her new 
position. Plaintiff’s supervisors then sought for Plaintiff to file a response to the PIP, requiring 
Plaintiff to compose several drafts indicating how Plaintiff intended to correct her allegedly 
insufficient job performance. These drafts were submitted over time until a final draft was accepted. 
Moreover, Plaintiff indicated that during this same time frame, Rodriguez confided in Plaintiff that 
Rodriguez was asked to “find stuff to write about Plaintiff.” Finally, in late August o f2007, Bittner 
accepted Plaintiff’s PIP. Ultimately, however, in October of 2007, Defendant terminated Plaintiff 
based on the advice of Izquierdo and the Administrative team. According to Plaintiff, all of these 
events provide sufficient indicia of a causal connection.
Despite the fact that a jury may ultimately agree with Defendant, the Court concludes that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether a causal connection exists between 
Plaintiff’s FMLA leave and her transfer and then termination. Although Defendant denies a causal 
connection, the Eleventh Circuit has established that the causal link element is to be construed 
broadly. In this regard, a plaintiff “merely has to prove that the protected activity and the negative 
employment action are not completely unrelated.” Pennington, 261 F.3d at 1266. (citing Olmstead, 
141 F.3d at 1460 (quoting EEOC v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 988 F.2d 1564, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 
1993)). Put another way, the causal connection prong requires Plaintiff to show that “the decision­
makers were aware of the protected conduct, and that the protected activity and the adverse action 
were not wholly unrelated.” Curtis v. Broward County, 292 Fed. App’x 882, 885 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(citations omitted).
With respect to Plaintiff’s selection for transfer to Medical Staff, the temporal proximity to 
her protected activity is significant. Indeed, Plaintiff’s transfer to the unit occurred only two weeks
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after she returned to the Hospital from her FMLA leave. Eleventh Circuit case law has made it clear 
that close temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action may suffice to 
establish a causal connection. Bass v. Board o f County Com’rs, Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 
1095, 1119; Curtis, 292 F. App’x at 885 (citing Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 
1364 (11th Cir. 2007)). Where a plaintiff seeks to establish a causal connection through temporal 
proximity, the temporal proximity must be ‘very close[.]’” Curtis, 292 F. App’x at 885 (quoting 
Clark County SchoolDist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)). Here, the temporal proximity is 
extremely close.
Likewise, the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment at the Hospital presents similar 
questions of fact that must be resolved by a jury, particularly when those facts are viewed in the light 
most favorable to Plaintiff. As noted by Plaintiff, other events occurred between the transfer and the 
termination that could be construed as evidence of a causal link. See Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1455 
(listing a series of adverse events after that occurred after plaintiff filed EEOC charge). During 
Plaintiff’s three-month review, Plaintiff received numerous negative remarks on her performance 
evaluation, whereas in her prior twelve-year tenure with the Hospital, Plaintiff had received positive 
evaluations. Additionally, after Plaintiff received the negative performance evaluation, Bittner told 
Plaintiff that if  she was unhappy with the transfer, she could simply accept a severance package and 
leave the Hospital. Both of these actions could be seen as an attempt by the Hospital to force 
Plaintiff out. This is true particularly in light of Rodriguez’s alleged comment that she was asked 
to “find stuff to write about Plaintiff.”
Moreover, when asked to, Plaintiff prepared a number of responses to the PIP, with the first 
few being rejected by Bittner. It was only when Plaintiff submitted her last response in August of
21
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2007, that she was deemed to have complied with Bittner’s request. Finally, it is undisputed that 
other employees terminated at the same time as Plaintiff had taken FMLA leave on more than one 
occasion during the two years prior to their termination. Although the Hospital has come forth with 
other reasons for these employees’ termination, the Court must take these facts in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiff. For all of the reasons set forth herein, the Court declines to find that no 
genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff can show a causal connection between her FMLA 
leave and her termination. The Court is aware that Defendant has cited to Clark in support of its 
argument in favor of summary judgment, but this is simply not a case where Plaintiff relies merely 
on the timing of Defendant’s actions.
In sum, because the Court finds that material issues of fact exist as to whether there is a 
causal connection between Plaintiff’s FMLA leave, her selection for transfer to Medical Staff and 
her ultimate termination, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied. Taking the 
facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury could find that Plaintiff has successfully 
established a prima facie case of retaliation. Indeed, the Court notes the relatively low threshold 
necessary to demonstrate the causal connection element of a prima facie case of retaliation and finds 
that a reasonable jury could conclude that the protected activity and the adverse action were not 
wholly unrelated. Accordingly, under McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, the burden shifts to 
Defendant to set forth a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its alleged adverse employment actions. 
See Section F infra.
D. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Disability Discrimination
1. Applicability of ADAAA
The parties dispute the applicable standard for Plaintiff’s disability claims. While Plaintiff
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asserts that the January 1, 2009, amendments to the ADA (referred to as the “ADAAA”) apply to 
Plaintiff’s case, Defendant contends that the ADAAA does not apply retroactively and, therefore, 
does not govern this case. After careful review, the Court agrees with Defendant that the ADAAA 
does not apply to Plaintiff because her claims stem from acts that occurred prior to January 1,2009.
Due to the absence of congressional intent to give the amendments retroactive effect, courts 
addressing the issue have held that the ADAAA does not apply retroactively. Plaintiff is correct, 
however, that the Eleventh Circuit has not determined whether the ADAAA applies retroactively. 
In Shannon v. Potter, 2009 WL 1598442, at *2 n. 5 (11th Cir. June 9, 2009), while finding it 
unnecessary to address the question, the court noted the lack of Eleventh Circuit published opinion 
on the issue. Prior to the Shannon decision, however, in another unpublished per curium decision, 
the Eleventh Circuit suggested that the ADAAA does not apply retroactively. Fikes v. Wal-Mart, 
Inc., 322 F. App’x 882, 883 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009). In Fikes, the court, in a footnote, stated,
Plaintiff makes no argument that the amendments should apply 
retroactively; and absent Congressional expression to the contrary, a 
presumption against retroactive application applies when the new 
legislation would “impair rights a party possessed when he acted, 
increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed. Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229 
(1994). So, we look to the ADA as it was in effect at the time of the 
alleged discrimination.
Id. at 883, n.1.10
Likewise, other Courts have held that the ADAAA should not be applied retroactively. 
Milholland v. Sumner County Bd. o f Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 565-66 (6th Cir. 2009); Kieswetter v.
10 Because Fikes is an unpublished opinion, it is not binding on this Court and, instead, 
is only persuasive authority. Baker v. Birmingham Board o f Education, 531 F.3d 1336, 1338 
(11th Cir. 2008).
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Caterpillar, Inc., 295 F. App’x 850, 851 (7th Cir. 2008); EEOC v. Agro Distr., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 
469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit determined in a published opinion that the 
amendments contained in the ADAAA “do not apply retroactively.” Id. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit 
in a published opinion, discussed the applicability of the ADAAA. Specifically, in Milholland v. 
Sumner County Bd. o f Educ, 569 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2009), the court found that the ADAAA did not 
govern the case because “its application would have the type of impermissibly retroactive effect that 
requires a clearly-stated congressional intent.” Id. at 565. The Sixth Circuit noted that the conduct 
at issue in the case occurred before the ADAAA became effective and, “Congress did not ‘expressly 
prescribe []’ whether the statute should reach back to cover this conduct.” Id. at 566 (quoting 
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273). Although the court recognized that Congress enacted the ADAAA to 
reinstate a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA, it found that Congress’s intent 
to “restore” protections “does not by itself, reveal whether Congress intends the [ADAAA] to apply 
retroactively.” Id. (citations omitted). Finally, the court noted that the ADAAA, if  applied 
retroactively, “attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment” and, 
therefore, concluded that the ADAAA does not apply retroactively to pre-amendment conduct. Id. 
at 567.
Additionally, as noted by Defendant, the EEOC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under the 
ADAAA (dated September 29, 2009) states that the EEOC takes the position that “[t]he ADAAA 
does not apply retroactively.” The Notice further explains that the ADAAA would not apply to a 
situation in which an employer allegedly failed to hire, terminated, or denied a reasonable 
accommodation to someone with a disability as late as December of 2008. See 
http ://eeoc. gov/policy/ docs/qanda_adaaa_nprm.html.
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In contrast, as noted by Plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit in Rohr v. Salt River Project Agricultural 
Imp. & Power Dist, 555 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2009), relied upon the ADAAA in its analysis in a 
reversal of summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Rohr court discussed the ADAAA 
because it shed light on Congress’s original intent when Congress enacted the ADA, but Rohr did 
not expressly decide whether the ADAAA applied retroactively to the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 853.
Plaintiff also relies on an unpublished Sixth Circuit decision decided prior to Milholland, in 
which the court concluded that the ADAAA applied retroactively to claims that seek prospective 
relief. Jenkins v. National Bd. o f Medical Examiners, 2009 WL 331638 at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 
2009). In Jenkins, a medical student sought additional time on a licensing examination as an 
accommodation for a diagnosed reading disorder. Id. at * 1. The district court found that the plaintiff 
did not qualify as disabled under the ADA, but the Sixth Circuit, on appeal, remanded that case for 
further consideration in light of the ADAAA because the appeal was pending when the ADAAA 
became effective. Id. Because the case involved prospective relief and was pending when the 
amendments became effective, the Court found that the ADAAA must be applied. Id.
The Court finds that Rohr and Jenkins are not applicable to the facts of this case. First, the 
Ninth Circuit in Rohr did not decide the issue of whether the ADAAA applies retroactively. Second, 
although the Court in Jenkins concluded that it would apply the ADAAA retroactively, the holding 
is limited to the facts of that case -  where the plaintiff’s claims sought prospective injunctive relief 
(i.e., an accommodation on a test that would occur in the future). Indeed, the court in Jenkins 
acknowledged that because the plaintiff sought prospective relief, no injustice would result from 
applying the ADAAA. Id. In the instant case, Plaintiff does not seek relief for an event that has not 
yet happened and, therefore, the reasoning of Jenkins does not apply to this case.
25
Based on the foregoing, the Court will follow the principle set forth in Agro, Milholland, and 
Fikes that the ADAAA does not apply retroactively. Accordingly, the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s 
disability claim under the ADA.
2. The ADA and FCRA Claims for Disability Discrimination
Counts II and III allege claims under the FCRA11 and ADA for disability discrimination 
relating to Plaintiff’s sickle cell disease. The ADA12 prohibits covered employers from 
discriminating “against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361; 1365 (11th Cir. 2000). 
Congress enacted the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” Harris v. H&W Contracting Co.,
102 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1996).
To assert a claim for disability discrimination successfully, Plaintiff must demonstrate that 
(1) she has a disability; (2) she is a “qualified individual” for the position; and (3) Defendant 
unlawfully discriminated against her because ofthe disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a); Raytheon Co. 
v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n. 3, (2003); D ’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1225­
26 (11th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff must also show that the employer has actual or constructive
11 Federal law interpreting the ADA is applicable to claims arising under the FCRA 
and, thus, the Court analyzes the claims together. Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 
1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007); Garavito v. City o f Tampa, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (M.D.Fla. 2009).
12 Because the ADA is based on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et 
seq., courts rely on cases decided under the Act to interpret similar language in the ADA. See 
Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000).
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knowledge of the disability or considered the employee to be disabled. Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & 
Associates, Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1996). As with a claim for retaliation, if Plaintiff can 
establish a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, non­
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 49 n.3; Hilburn v. 
Murata Elec. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 1999). If the employer is able to meet its 
burden of production, the employee may still prevail on her claims if  she can demonstrate that the 
employer’s reason is pretextual. Id. Here, Defendant asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment 
because Plaintiff cannot establish that she has a disability under the ADA.
a. Is Plaintiff Disabled under the ADA?
A person is considered to be disabled under the ADA if he or she has “(A) a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) [is] regarded as having such an impairment.”
42 U.S.C. 12102(2); Harris v. H&WContracting Co., 102 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff is 
deemed to be “disabled” for ADA purposes if he or she satisfies any one of these three definitions. 
Gordon, 100 F.3d at 911. Considering whether a person is disabled under subsection (A) involves 
three steps. First, the Court considers whether the individual suffers from an impairment. Bragdon 
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). Next, the Court must identify the life activity upon which the 
plaintiff relies and then determine whether it constitutes a major life activity under the ADA. Id. 
Finally, the Court determines whether the impairment “substantially” limits the major life activity.
Id.
With respect to the first step, the ADA does not define “impairment,” but courts have sought 
guidance from the EEOC regulations commenting on Title I of the ADA. These regulations provide
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that a “physical impairment” is any “physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, 
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, 
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, 
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic, and lymphatic, skin and endocrine.” 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(h)(1). Although Defendant disputes that Plaintiff is “disabled” for purposes of her ADA 
claim, Defendant does not appear to contest that Plaintiff suffers from an impairment.13 Instead, 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s sickle cell disease does not substantially limit a major life activity. 
In this regard, Defendant emphasizes that “[a] physical impairment, standing alone . . . is not 
necessarily a disability as contemplated by the ADA.” Gordon, 100 F.3d at 911. (citations omitted). 
Instead, the ADA requires that the impairment limit one or more of the individual’s major life 
activities. Id.
b. Substantial Limitation of a Major Life Activity
The determination of whether a person is disabled is made on a case-by-case basis and “is 
not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the 
effect of that impairment on the life of the individual.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 
471,483 (1999), superceded by statute. With this in mind, the Court reviews how Plaintiff’s sickle 
cell disease affects her life, particularly any of her “major life activities.”
The ADA does not define the phrase “major life activity,” but EEOC regulations explain that 
they include basic activities that the average person in the general population can perform with little 
or no difficulty. 29 C.F. R. § 1630.2(i). Major life activities include functions such as “caring for
13 Indeed, Plaintiff’s sickle cell disease fits under the regulation’s definition of 
“physical impairment” because it is a physiological condition affecting the hemic system.
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oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); D ’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1226-27. Although the list provides 
examples of major life activities, it is not exhaustive. SeeBragdon, 524 U.S. at 638. Here, it is not 
exactly clear which “major life activity” Plaintiff asserts has been substantially limited by her sickle 
cell disease, but, it appears that Plaintiff intends to assert the major life activity of caring for herself 
(and possibly working).14 Although, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant asserts that 
Plaintiff failed to identify any major life activity affected by her illness, in its Reply, it acknowledges 
that in Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed Facts, she contends that she is not able to care for herself. 
Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed Facts references her deposition testimony in which she answered 
in the affirmative when asked “do you have any limitations on your ability to care for yourself or 
function on a daily basis as a result of being afflicted with this disease?” See Pltff depo at p. 48. 
Accordingly, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff 
has identified the major life activity of caring for herself as being substantially limited by her sickle 
cell disease.
Defendant contends that sickle cell disease varies widely from individual to individual and, 
while Defendant appears to recognize that Plaintiff suffers from major sickle cell crises, Defendant 
emphasizes that these crises are intermittent. Indeed, Defendant points out that only occasionally 
does Plaintiff experience the onset of a major crisis that requires hospitalization and medication. As
14 With respect to the major life activity of working, “substantially limits” means 
“significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in 
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and 
abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial 
limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1997); Hilburn v. 
Murata Electronics North America, Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1999).
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noted by Defendant, in her twelve-year tenure with the Hospital, Plaintiff suffered from major crises 
in 1998, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2006 -  approximately once every two years. Defendant also states 
that in the absence of a major crisis, the only two activities affected by Plaintiff’s illness are 
Plaintiff’s involvement in stressful activities and her ability to engage in extreme activities such as 
running. Of further significance, Defendant notes that Plaintiff has never claimed that she cannot 
work except in the rare instance of a major crisis. Because Plaintiff was capable of working full 
time, Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not meet the ADA’s definition of “disabled” even though 
Plaintiff’s illness required intermittent hospitalization. Likewise, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s 
ability to care for herself is not substantially limited when Plaintiff’s sickle cell disease presents a 
major crisis for a few weeks every two years or so.
In conducting its analysis of whether Plaintiff is substantially limited in her maj or life activity 
of caring for herself, the Court notes that the phrase “substantially limits” means that Plaintiff is 
“unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can 
perform” or is “[significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an 
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or 
duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life 
activity.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(i) (1997). When determining whether a disability qualifies as a 
substantial limitation of a major life activity, the Court considers “(1) the nature and severity of the 
impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent or long­
term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.” 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2); Schwertfager v. City o f Boynton Beach, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1358-59 
(S.D. Fla. 1999) (citing Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assoc., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 911 (11th Cir. 1996))).
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To rebut Defendant’s arguments, Plaintiff cites to various cases asserting that the episodic 
and somewhat intermittent nature of her sickle cell crises does not prevent her from being disabled 
under the ADA. First, Plaintiff cites to Vande Zande v. State o f Wis. Dept. o f Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 
544 (7th Cir. 1995), to emphasize that often the “disabling aspect of a disability is, precisely, an 
intermittent manifestation of the disability, rather than the underlying impairment.” In Vande Zande, 
the Court found that the plaintiff’s episodic pressure ulcers (resulting from a tumor on her spinal 
cord) were part of her disability.
Likewise, Plaintiff cites to EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co., 570 F.3d 606, 618 (5th 
Cir. 2009), in support of her argument that relapsing conditions can constitute ADA disabilities, 
depending on the nature of each individual case. In Chevron, the Fifth Circuit noted that conditions 
such as multiple sclerosis, epilepsy, and colitis, even though episodic in nature, can constitute 
disabilities. Id. Thus, the court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff was 
disabled due to chronic fatigue syndrome (“CFS”) because she was substantially limited in the maj or 
life activities of caring for herself, sleeping, and thinking, even though the expected duration of the 
plaintiff’s disability was indefinite and unknowable. Id. at 620.
Most significantly, the Sixth Circuit in Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer’s Research 
Center, 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998), found that the plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether her chronic pustular psoriasis substantially limited the major life activities of 
being able to care for herself and to work. The plaintiff in Cehrs was able to work without incident 
until she suffered a flare-up of her psoriasis, during which time the plaintiff was unable to work for 
approximately two-and-one-half months. Id. at 778. Although the plaintiff had not suffered a 
similar flare-up in eight years and the defendant argued that the plaintiff was “disabled” only during
31
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flare-ups, the court found that summary judgment was precluded where an issue of fact remained 
regarding whether plaintiff’s psoriasis substantially limited her major life activities. Id. at 781. In 
announcing its decision, the court looked at the fact that no cure for psoriasis exists, plaintiff’s type 
of psoriasis was severe, and even during the dormant stage of the impairment, the plaintiff 
experienced pain. Id. Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiff received weekly medication and 
treatment, even when her psoriasis was dormant. Id.
Defendant, in its Reply, distinguishes Plaintiff’s cases and argues that they do not support 
Plaintiff’s argument in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. First, Defendant 
states that the issue in Vande Zande was not whether the plaintiff was disabled, but rather, whether 
her employer was required to accommodate an episodic symptom of the plaintiff’s paralysis. Next, 
Defendant argues that the test applied in Chevron weighs in favor of Defendant, not Plaintiff. 
Defendant points out that the court in Chevron stated that the relevant time frame for assessing the 
existence of a disability is the time of the adverse employment action. Because the Chevron plaintiff 
suffered from CFS at the time of her discharge, her claim was not denied on summary judgment. 
Finally, Defendant distinguishes Cehrs by emphasizing that although the plaintiff suffered from 
intermittent flare-ups of psoriasis, she was also limited in caring for herself between flare-ups due 
to pain.
Although the Court appreciates Defendant’s efforts to distinguish Plaintiff’s cases, it finds 
that the overlying message of the case law is clear: the episodic nature of Plaintiff’s sickle cell crises 
do not necessarily preclude her from establishing a disability under the ADA. With respect to the 
timing of the adverse action, at least with respect to Plaintiff’s transfer, Plaintiff had recently 
returned to work after having been hospitalized for a significant amount of time. Moreover, just as
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Case 0:08-cv-61826-RSR Document 95 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/30/10 17:21:49 Page 33
of 52
the plaintiff in Cehrs experienced symptoms between flare-ups, the record before the Court 
establishes that Plaintiff suffers from fatigue and muscle weakness on a permanent and long-term 
basis. In this respect, the timing of the adverse action is significant because Plaintiff’s transfer to 
Medical Staff occurred shortly after her return from FMLA leave.
Looking to the factors set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j ), the Court notes that Plaintiff states 
that she suffers from fatigue and muscle weakness that limit her on a daily basis, compared to the 
average person. In addition to suffering from major crises, Plaintiff states that she experiences non­
major crises more frequently between major crises. According to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, 
when she suffers a non-major crisis, she has to stop what she is doing, take prescription medication, 
and rest in bed. Plaintiff testified that she has had to leave work early when she has endured a non­
major crisis and has had to avoid stress and extreme physical activity.
The permanent nature of Plaintiff’s sickle cell disease is also significant. Indeed, Plaintiff’s 
sickle cell disease was detected in 1972 and, because the disease is not curable at this time, it is 
expected to remain with her for her entire life. And, although she may suffer from major crises 
relatively infrequently, it is virtually certain that Plaintiff will experience such crises for the rest of 
her life. As it was with the plaintiff in Cehrs, the psychological impact of knowing that a major 
crisis can strike at any time is significant. Finally, due to the nature of sickle cell disease, when 
Plaintiff encounters a major crisis, she is hospitalized, given oxygen and pain medication, followed 
by bed rest, and she is otherwise unable to care for herself. The expected duration of Plaintiff’s 
impairment is infinite with respect to the disease itself and uncertain with regard to the duration of 
each episode of a major crisis.
Like the Plaintiff in Cehrs, Plaintiff notes that she receives ongoing treatment for her sickle
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cell disease. Plaintiff takes folic acid and multiple vitamins on a daily basis for her sickle cell 
disease, and her primary care physician, Dr. McClean, has prescribed Darvocet for Plaintiff to take 
when she feels a sickle cell crisis coming on. Plaintiff also asserts that she has been prescribed 
Plavix, HCT2 (hydroshlorothiazide), Amlodipine for hypertension, Metaprolol for angina, and 
Protonix for hiatial hernia; many of these conditions constitute complications of her sickle cell 
disease. Medical records reveal that Plaintiff sees her hematologist, Dr. Varki, on an ongoing basis. 
Although Dr. Varki’s records reflect extended periods of time during which Plaintiff is without 
significant symptoms, the records also reveal that Plaintiff suffers weakness, weight loss, and 
shortness of breath. Finally, Plaintiff indicates that she experiences chronic anemia, her gall bladder 
has been removed, she has a heart murmur, gout, an enlarged spleen, and elevated bilirubin, all of 
which she explains are complications of sickle cell disease. Plaintiff also notes that she had a stroke 
and continues to suffer from hypertension.
In Vincent v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, Inc. o f Florida, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1405 (S.D. Fla. 
1998), the parties conceded that the plaintiff was disabled for purposes of the ADA because he 
suffered from sickle cell disease. Although in that decision Judge Moore did not make a finding of 
disability, he also did not reject the parties’ concession of that element of the plaintiff’s ADA claim. 
Rather, proceeding from the premise that sickle cell disease constitutes a disability under the ADA, 
Judge Moore noted that the action presented “a unique set of facts” because the plaintiff did not 
constantly suffer from the effects of his disability. Id. at 1416. Although the court found that the 
plaintiff’s ADA claim failed because he was not qualified for the job, it did discuss the nature of 
sickle cell disease. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s crises were sporadic and struck with 
or without warning and with varying degrees of intensity. In short, Vincent provides an example of
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a case where the court treated sickle cell disease as a disability, despite the sporadic nature of the 
illness’s symptoms. Thus, in an appropriate case, sickle cell disease can constitute a disability under 
the ADA.
Moreover, the Court finds that whether Plaintiff’s sickle cell disease substantially limits her 
ability to care for herself or work constitutes an issue of fact. In Harris v. H&WContracting Co.,
102 F.3d 516 (11th Cir 1996), a case involving a plaintiff with Graves’ disease, the Eleventh Circuit 
acknowledged that the plaintiff was not required to prove that her Graves’ disease constituted a 
disability under the ADA in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Instead, the 
plaintiff had to show only the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her 
Graves’ disease substantially limited a major life activity. Id. at 521-22. And while some have read 
Bragdon to imply that a finding of disability is a question of law for the Court to determine, the 
Eleventh Circuit in Harris treated the issue as one of fact, although the Court notes that Harris was 
decided after Bragdon and the opinion does not refer to the Bragdon decision.
Other circuits, however, have discussed Bragdon and have treated the determination of a 
plaintiff’s disability as a question of fact for the jury. See Weisberg v. Riverside Tp. Bd. o f Educ.,
180 F. App’x 357 (3rd Cir. 2006); Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Dept., 380 
F.3d 751 (3rd Cir. 2004); Dvorak v. Mostardi Platt Assoc., Inc., 289 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2002); Bristol 
v. Board o f County Com’rs o f County o f Clear Creek, 281 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2002); Frazier v. 
Delco Electronics Corp., 263 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2001); Hayes v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 17 F. 
App’x 317 (6th Cir. 2001); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001); EEOC v. R.J. 
Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999).
District courts within the Eleventh Circuit have recognized Bragdon and similarly have
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treated the determination of a disability as a question of fact for the jury. See Mize v. Centura 
Financial Services, 2009 WL 3419586 (S .D. Ala. Oct. 21,2009); Irizarry v. Mid Florida Community 
Services, Inc., 2009 WL 2135113 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2009); Quitto v. Bay Colony Golf Club, Inc., 
2007 WL 2002537 (M.D. Fla. July 5, 2007); Smith v. Quintiles Transnational Corp., 509 F. Supp. 
2d 1193 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Richards v. Publix Supermarket, Inc., 2007 WL 570090 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 
20, 2007). See alsoDoebele v. Sprint/UnitedMgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1129 (10th Cir. 2003) (only 
the first two elements of whether a plaintiff suffers from an actual disability are determined by the 
court as a matter of law). This Court agrees with those courts concluding that the issue of whether 
an impairment substantially limits a major life activity constitutes an issue of fact.
As other courts have noted, the language in Bragdon that has led some courts to conclude 
that determining whether an impairment constitutes a disability is an issue of law is explained by the 
fact that the Supreme Court was reviewing cross-motions for summaryjudgment. Indeed, the Bristol 
Court explained, “[I]t is apparent that the Supreme Court in Bragdon assumed the “substantially 
limits” step was factual when it wrote, ‘We agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
that no triable issue of fact impedes a ruling on the question of . . . [whether] Respondent’s HIV 
infection is a physical impairment which substantially limits a maj or life activity, as the ADA defines 
it.’” Bristol, 281 F.3d at 1159.
Viewing the record here in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that all of the 
medical evidence in the record as well as Plaintiff’s affidavit explaining how her sickle cell disease 
affects her on an ongoing basis, provides a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that 
Plaintiff suffers from an impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of caring for 
herself and, at times, working.
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c. Did Defendant Regard Plaintiff as Being Disabled Under the ADA?
A plaintiff is “regarded as” having a disability if “(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes 
that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or 
(2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits 
one or more major life activities.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. Hence, a person is “regarded as” having 
a disability if her employer perceives her as having a disability, even if  no factual basis exists for the 
perception. Richardson v. Honda Manufacturing o f Alabama, LLC, 635 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1278 
(S.D. Ala. 2009) (citing Carruthers v. BSA Advertising, Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
“As with actual impairments, however, the perceived impairment must be one that, if  real, would 
limit substantially a major life activity of the individual.” Id.
Because the Court finds that a genuine issue of fact exists whether Plaintiff’s impairment 
substantially limits her major life activities, it is not necessary for the Court to assess whether 
Defendant “regarded’ Plaintiff as being disabled.
Finally, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant does not argue that the remaining 
elements of Plaintiff’s disability claim prevent her from establishing a prima facie case. 
Accordingly, the Court proceeds to analyze Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to race, national origin, age, 
and gender discrimination.
E. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Race, National Origin, Age, and Gender
Discrimination
Counts IV through XI set forth claims of discrimination based upon race, national origin, 
gender, and age pursuant to Title VII, the FCRA, and the ADEA. Title VII provides that it is an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
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individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Thus, an employer may not take an adverse 
employment action against an employee on the basis of that employee’s protected status. The FCRA 
is patterned after Title VII and, thus, courts have held that decisions construing Title VII are 
applicable when considering claims under the FCRA. Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F. 
3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998).
Likewise, the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The ADEA 
applies to individuals who are at least 40 years of age. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). “Under the ADEA, a 
plaintiff claiming disparate treatment bears the ultimate burden of proving that age was a 
determining factor in the employer’s decision to fire him or her.” Carter v. City o f Miami, 870 F.2d 
578, 581 (11th Cir. 1989).
______ In this case, Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against in two ways: she was
demoted and then ultimately fired. The parties dispute the elements of the applicable prima facie 
case -  Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated as a result of a RIF and 
Plaintiff contends that she was discharged for discriminatory reasons. In its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s transfer to Medical Staff was not an adverse action 
and, therefore, dedicates its discussion of Plaintiff’s discrimination claims to her termination. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that both her transfer and termination constituted adverse actions 
and that a reasonable fact finder could find that these actions resulted from discrimination.
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1. Plaintiffs Transfer to the Medical Staff Unit
With respect to Plaintiff s discrimination claims based on her transfer to the Medical Staffing 
unit, to prove aprima facie case, she must show that she ( 1 ) was a member of a protected class, (2) 
was qualified for the job, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) was replaced by 
someone outside her protected class. Hinson v. Clinch County, Georgia Bd. o f Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 
828 (11th Cir. 2000). With respect to Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to the ADEA, the prima facie case 
is similar -  Plaintiff must show that (1) she was a member of a protected group of persons between 
the ages of 40 and 70, (2) she was subject to an adverse employment action, (3) a substantially 
younger person filled the position from which she was discharged, and (4) she was qualified to do 
the job for which she was rejected. Chapman v. A.I. Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 
2000); Damon, 196 F.3d at 1359.
In this case, no dispute exists that Plaintiff was a member of a protected class based upon her 
race, national origin, age, and gender. Indeed, Plaintiff is a Black female of Jamaican descent and 
was in her fifties at the time of her transfer. Likewise, it appears that Defendant does not dispute that 
Plaintiff was qualified for her job. Indeed, because Plaintiff was discharged from a previously held 
position, she does not need to satisfy the proof-of-qualification prong of the test. See Young v. 
General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 830 n.3 (11th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Moreover, 
although Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show that she suffered from an adverse action with 
respect to her transfer, as noted above in section C.1, supra, the Court finds that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action when she was 
transferred from the position of Executive Secretary in the Hospital’s Administrative Office to the 
Medical Staff Office.
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Accordingly, the only remaining element that Plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination with respect to her transfer is that she was replaced by someone outside of her 
protected class. The Court finds that, with respect to her transfer, Plaintiff has set forth enough 
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Plaintiff was replaced by someone 
outside of her protected class. Here, it is clear that Defendant transferred Cruz into its 
Administrative Office at the same time that Plaintiff was transferred to Medical Staff. In fact, 
Defendant admits that Plaintiff was transferred to Medical Staff because Izquierdo wanted Cruz to 
transfer into the Administration Office. Cruz is substantially younger than Plaintiff and is a Hispanic 
male. Hence, Cruz belongs to a different race, national origin, and gender, and is younger than 
Plaintiff.
The relevant question, however, is whether Cruz can be deemed to have “replaced” Plaintiff 
as Executive Secretary in Administration. Defendant contends that Plaintiff was not replaced. 
Instead, Defendant argues that it eliminated Plaintiff’s position of Executive Secretary and created 
a new position with the combined responsibilities of Executive Secretary and physician contracts. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that Defendant essentially swapped Plaintiff and Cruz ’ s positions, 
with Cruz taking over Plaintiff’s position as Executive Secretary with the Hospital with the mere 
addition of another task to be performed in the job.
The Court finds that a question of fact exists as to whether Cruz replaced Plaintiff. First, it 
is significant that the Personnel Action Request (PAR) effectuating the transfer of Cruz out of 
Medical Staff to the Administrative Office lists the transfer as a change to the position of Executive 
Secretary. And, although Defendant added the handling of physician contracts to Cruz’s position 
description, merely adding a responsibility to the position does not necessarily show that the position
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of Executive Secretary was eliminated. Indeed, Cruz performed all other functions of Executive 
Secretary engaged in by Plaintiff. Likewise, the Court notes that after Cruz resigned from the 
Hospital, Defendant ran an advertisement seeking to fill his position. Under the heading of “position 
summary,” Cruz’s position was described as “Executive Secretary.” This information suffices to 
raise a question of fact with respect to whether Defendant eliminated Plaintiff’s position of 
Executive Secretary or, rather, Cruz replaced Plaintiff when Defendant transferred her to Cruz’s 
former position in Medical Staff.
In conclusion, Plaintiff has met her burden of setting forth a prima facie case of 
discrimination based on her transfer to the Medical Staff Office. Thus, the burden shifts to 
Defendant to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions.
2. Plaintiff’s Termination
With respect to Plaintiff’s discrimination claims based on her termination, the parties dispute 
whether Plaintiff’s termination resulted from a RIF at the Hospital. On the one hand, Defendant 
contends that Plaintiff, along with four other employees, was selected by Izquierdo and the 
Administration for termination as a result of a RIF. Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that the RIF 
is “a sham and a pretext for discrimination.” See D.E. 48 at p. 16.
The dispute between the parties is significant because the determination of whether Plaintiff’s 
termination resulted from a RIF impacts the elements that Plaintiff must set forth to establish her 
prima facie case. Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000) (“case law 
suggests that the standard for establishing a prima facie case depends on whether the case concerns 
a reduction in force as opposed to a termination.”) (citation omitted). With respect to a reduction 
in force case, a plaintiff must present evidence by which a fact finder might reasonably conclude that
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the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of the protected class. Id. (citing Earley v. 
Champion International Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 1990)).15 In a termination case, 
however, the plaintiff is not required to make such a showing in herprima facie case. Id. Instead, 
to establish a discriminatory discharge, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that 
she (1) was a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the job, (3) suffered an adverse 
employment action, and (4) was replaced by someone outside of the protected class. Cuddeback v. 
Florida Board o f Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004). Hence, the elements necessary to 
establish a discriminatory discharge are the same as those set forth above with respect to Plaintiff’s 
transfer.
After reviewing the evidence in the record, the Court finds that it is unable to classify neatly 
the type of case at issue. In this regard, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether 
Plaintiff’s termination resulted from a RIF or whether, instead, Defendant used the alleged RIF as 
an explanation to excuse its termination of Plaintiff. First, the Court notes that only five of the 
Hospital’s numerous employees were terminated as a result of the alleged RIF. Additionally, of the 
five employees terminated, two (i.e., Abe Geyer and Annie Mansfield) had planned on “retiring.” 
Moreover, Defendant offered another employee, Audrey Lanzo, another position with the Hospital,
15 More specifically, to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination in the context of a 
RIF, the plaintiff must show that she is (1) member of protected class and was discharged, (2) 
was qualified for her position or another position available at the time of discharge, (3) suffered 
an adverse employment action, and (4) evidence exists from which a reasonable trier of fact 
could conclude that the employer intended to discriminate against Plaintiff on the basis of her 
protected class in reaching its decision. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1331 
(11th Cir. 1998).
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but she declined.16 On the other hand, Plaintiff points out that the Hospital continued to hire 
employees at the time of the RIF, as noted by Defendant, these new employees were all hired for 
clinical positions. Hence, this fact does not necessarily controvert Defendant’s stated intention to 
reduce non-clinical positions.
More significantly, however, the utilization reports that Defendant alleges support its 
decision to eliminate positions in a RIF present a question, at least with respect to Plaintiff’s 
position. In the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the reports can be seen to suggest that as of 
September 30, 2007, approximately one month prior to Plaintiff’s termination, the Medical Staff 
department was not over-staffed. The reports reveal that the target hours for the department totaled 
618 hours and the actual hours used amounted to only 595.25. Thus, the Medical Staff department 
was under its target hours and appears to have been staffed appropriately. Likewise, the utilization 
report for October 31,2007, shows the target hours for Medical Staff as 662.40, with the actual hours 
used at 589.75. In November of 2007, after Plaintiff’s termination, the utilization report indicates 
that the target hours for Medical Staff were reduced to 457.60, but other departments in which 
Defendant cut positions did not similarly see their target hours lessened. Instead, for example, in the 
X-ray and Ultrasound departments, target hours remained approximately the same, with the 
department being able to meet the target because of the elimination of positions. In contrast, it does 
not appear that the Medical Staff department had to eliminate a position to be able to meet its target 
hours.
16 The Court notes that Lanzo was an RN working in an administrative position and 
was offered an opportunity to return to an RN position. Defendant explains that the offer to 
return to a clinical position comports with the Hospital’s goal to reduce non-clinical positions so 
that patient care was not affected.
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All of these facts could support a finding by a reasonable jury that, perhaps, Plaintiff’s 
termination did not result from a RIF, but rather, from a simple termination. At a minimum, a 
genuine issue of fact exists with regard to this issue. For purposes of the summary judgment motion, 
the Court takes the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as it must. Accordingly, in resolving 
the pending motion, the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s claim in the context of a discriminatory 
discharge. As noted above, to establish a discriminatory discharge, Plaintiff must show that she (1) 
was a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the job, (3) suffered an adverse employment 
action, and (4) was replaced by someone outside of the protected class. Cuddeback v. Florida Board 
o f Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004).
As noted above, Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff, as a Black female of Jamaican 
descent in her fifties, was a member of a protected class. Accordingly, Plaintiff has met the first 
prong of herprima facie case. Further, Defendant appears to concede that Plaintiff was qualified for 
her job at the time of her termination. Moreover, neither party disputes that Plaintiff suffered an 
adverse employment action. Indeed, unlike with regard to Plaintiff’s transfer, which Defendant 
argued did not constitute an adverse employment action, both parties agree that Plaintiff’s 
termination meets the third prong of the prima facie case.
Finally, pertaining to the last prong of the prima facie case, the Court finds that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists as to whether someone outside of Plaintiff’s protected class replaced her, 
at least with respect to her race, national origin, and age. In this regard, although the Hospital 
eliminated Plaintiff’s position in the Medical Staff department, it is undisputed that remaining 
employees (Grana, Evans, Huang, and Vincenne) absorbed the duties of Plaintiff’s job. All of these 
remaining employees were younger than Plaintiff and are white, Asian, or Hispanic.
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In Miller v. Aramark Corp., 2004 WL 1781103 at *4 (N.D. Ga. 2004), the court found that 
the plaintiff made out aprima facie case even though the employer in that case divided the plaintiff’s 
job duties among two employees after releasing the employee. The court noted that although the 
defendant did not “replace” the plaintiff by hiring a new employee, it replaced the plaintiff in the 
sense that it assigned his duties to two employees, both of whom were substantially younger than the 
plaintiff. Id. See also Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies, Inc, 120 F.3d 328, 334 (1st Cir. 
1997). Similarly, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff 
can meet the last prong of her prima facie case at least with respect to her claims of race, national 
origin, and age discrimination. The same cannot be said for Plaintiff’s claims of gender 
discrimination because the individuals “replacing” Plaintiff in the Medical Staff department are all 
women.
Because Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case that gives rise to an inference of 
discrimination with respect to Plaintiff’s claims for age, race, and national origin claims, the burden 
now shifts to Defendant to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for its employment action. The 
Court, finds, however, that because Plaintiff was “replaced” in her Medical Staff position with other 
female employees, she cannot make out a prima facie case with respect to her gender discrimination 
claims as they relate to her termination. For this reason, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment 
on the portions of Counts X and XI that assert claims for gender discrimination based upon 
Plaintiff’s termination.
F. Defendant’s Alleged Legitimate Business Reasons
As noted previously, where Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination or 
retaliation, the burden shifts to Defendant to come forward with evidence of a legitimate, non­
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retaliatory reason for the challenged employment action, Curtis, 292 F. App’x at 883 (11th Cir, 
2008); Pennington, 261 F.3d at 1266 (citing Olmstead, 141 F.3d at 1460); Brown, 563 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1378. This burden is “exceedingly light.” Defendant states that its decision to have Cruz handle 
the physician contracts as an Executive Secretary in administration is a legitimate, non­
discriminatory, and non-retaliatory business reason for transferring Plaintiff to the Medical Staff 
department. Likewise, Defendant contends that the RIF constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory, 
and non-retaliatory business reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment with the Hospital.
The Court finds that Defendant’s reasons are adequate to satisfy the employer’s burden of 
production, and Plaintiff does not appear to suggest otherwise. See Vessels v. Atlanta Independent 
School System, 408 F.3d 763, 769-70 (11th Cir. 2005) (employer’s burden is exceedingly light and 
is satisfied as long as the employer articulates a clear and reasonable non-discriminatory basis for 
its actions). Because Defendant has met its burden of providing a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason 
for its actions, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show 
that Defendant’s reasons are merely pretext and the real reason for its decision was discrimination 
or retaliation.
G. Pretext
In order to create a genuine issue of material fact on the question of pretext, Plaintiff must 
demonstrate that Defendant’s proffered legitimate business reason was not the real reason for the 
employment decision. Jackson v. State o f Alabama State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 
(11th Cir. 2005). In other words, a plaintiff must “cast sufficient doubt on the defendant’s proffered 
nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer’s proffered 
legitimate reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106
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F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Plaintiff may do so “either directly by 
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly 
by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id. In the latter 
approach, a plaintiff must demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a 
reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 
725 (11th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds.
A review of the record reveals evidence that would potentially allow a factfinder to disbelieve 
Defendant’s proffered explanation for its actions. First, with respect to Plaintiff’s transfer, as noted 
previously, the memorandum transferring Plaintiff out of her position of Executive Secretary in 
Administration to the Medical Staff department came directly on the heels of a major sickle cell 
crisis during which Plaintiff took FMLA leave due to her hospitalization. More specifically, Plaintiff 
returned from FMLA leave on January 15, 2007, and contends that Izquierdo approached her about 
the transfer only two weeks later. The Hospital’s records reveal that the transfer became effective 
on February 4, 2007. This short time frame raises a question as to what Izquierdo’s motives were 
in choosing Plaintiff to transfer to Medical Staffing.
Further, although Defendant claims that transferring Plaintiff to Medical Staff came as a 
result of Izquierdo’s desire to have physician contracts handled in Administration, this fact alone 
does not explain why Izquierdo selected Plaintiff to transfer out of Administration. The record 
reflects that prior to Izquierdo’s appointment as the CFO, Plaintiff’s co-worker Johnsen handled 
physician contracts. Hence, if  Izquierdo wanted the physician contracts to be handled in 
Administration, she could have assigned this task to Johnsen and avoided transferring Plaintiff out
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of the department. Likewise, Plaintiff testified that earlier in her career, she handled physician 
contracts, including preparing and auditing the contracts. Despite these facts, Izquierdo did not 
select Johnsen to take over the contract work and Izquierdo admits that she never considered whether 
Plaintiff could remain in her position and perform the physician contract work as part of her duties 
as Executive Secretary. As for Cruz, even if  Izquierdo wanted him to continue handling the 
physician contracts, his office was close to the Administrative Office and a short walk away.
Moreover, in her deposition testimony, Izquierdo admitted that over her career, she has hired 
a substantial number of Hispanic individuals to work under her supervision. Indeed, the significant 
majority of individuals Izquierdo has hired are of Hispanic descent. While, in itself, of course, there 
is nothing wrong with this fact, in the context of a case for race and national origin discrimination, 
it does at least create an issue of material fact as to the reasons for Izquierdo’s hiring decisions. 
Additionally, even after Izquierdo left the Hospital, she hired Cruz for yet another position. 
Although the evidence could show that all of the individuals hired by Izquierdo were, in fact, the 
most qualified for their positions, a reasonable jury could find based on her hiring tendencies, these 
facts at least create a material issue of fact as to whether Izquierdo discriminated against Plaintiff 
because she was not Hispanic. The information could also suggest that Izquierdo selected Cruz to 
“replace” Plaintiff because he was Hispanic.
Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Izquierdo made the decision to transfer Plaintiff 
to the Medical Staff department without consulting with the supervisors in that department. Also 
significant to the issue of pretext is the fact that in her twelve-year tenure with the Hospital, Plaintiff 
had received good performance reviews. When Izquierdo took over as CFO and after Plaintiff’s 
transfer to Medical Staff, however, Plaintiff received a negative performance evaluation for the first
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time. With respect to the performance evaluation, Plaintiff revealed that Rodriguez confided in 
Plaintiff that she was told to “find stuff” to write about Plaintiff.
It is also significant that Izquierdo, the same decision-maker with respect to Plaintiff’s 
transfer out of the Administrative Office, was directly involved in the decision to terminate Plaintiff. 
Hence, if  Izquierdo had a bias against Plaintiff with respect to her transfer because she was not 
Hispanic, this bias could carry over to the termination process. The Court also notes that following 
Plaintiff’s negative performance evaluation, Bittner told Plaintiff that if  she was unhappy with the 
transfer, she could simply accept a severance package and leave the Hospital. This action could be 
seen as an attempt by the Hospital to force Plaintiff to resign on her own.
Additionally, and as noted previously, Plaintiff disputes that her termination was part of a 
RIF. Indeed, Plaintiff points out that of the five employees terminated, two planned on retiring. 
Defendant also offered another employee another position with the Hospital, but she declined. More 
significantly, the utilization reports that Defendant alleges support its decision to eliminate positions 
in a RIF present a question as to the Hospital’s motives, at least with respect to Plaintiff. The reports 
can be viewed as suggesting that prior to Plaintiff’s termination, the Medical Staff department was 
not over-staffed. The reports reveal that the Medical Staff department was under its target hours and 
appears to have been staffed appropriately. However, after Plaintiff’s termination, the utilization 
reports indicate that the target hours for Medical Staff were reduced to 457.60, but other departments 
in which Defendant reduced positions did not similarly reduce target hours. Hence, ajury could find 
that the Hospital did not have to eliminate a position in the Medical Staff department in order to meet 
its target hours and that Defendant’s explanation of Plaintiff’s termination was merely pretextual.
Plaintiff also points out that despite the fact that Bittner claims that the individuals selected
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for termination were reviewed for discrimination purposes, the individuals were mostly older 
employees, who had taken FMLA leave and who were Black, In this regard, four of the five 
individuals selected for termination were over the age of forty, Likewise, four of the individuals had 
taken FMLA leave on more than one occasion in the two years prior to their termination, Finally, 
three of the individuals terminated were Black, but none were Hispanic, Although these numbers, 
in and of themselves, do not necessarily indicate that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff due 
to her race, national origin, and age, a jury could find that they, along with other evidence, support 
a finding of pretext,
Finally, it is worth noting that Plaintiff’s supervisor, Rodriguez, did not attend the meeting 
to terminate Plaintiff because she was “not comfortable” with doing so, Additionally, following 
Plaintiff’s termination, after Cruz left to join Izquierdo at his new employment, the position of 
Executive Secretary in Administration became available, Despite Bittner’s advising Plaintiff that 
her “record will reflect that your termination is due to position elimination and that you are eligible 
for rehire,” the Hospital did not contact Plaintiff to determine whether she was interested in returning 
to the Hospital, This fact is significant in light of the fact that Cruz left his employment with the 
Hospital on December 19, 2007, only two months after Plaintiff was terminated,
Upon careful review of the summary judgment record, and construing the facts in the light 
most favorable to Plaintiff, an issue of fact remains concerning whether Defendant was motivated 
by the proffered legitimate reasons for transferring Plaintiff to the Medical Staff department and 
ultimately terminating her employment with the Hospital with respect to Plaintiff’s race, age, and 
national origin claims, Typically, a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case and has set forth 
sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to disbelieve an employer’s proffered explanation for its
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actions, creates a jury issue and, hence, a plaintiff will prevail over a defendant’s motion for 
summaryjudgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000) (citing 
Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1532 (11th Cir. 1997)).
With regard to Plaintiff’s claim that her transfer to Medical Staff was due to her gender, 
however, the Court does not conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists that Defendant’s 
reasons were pretextual and the real reason for the transfer was Plaintiff’s gender. Indeed, Plaintiff 
points only to the fact that Cruz, as a male, “replaced” Plaintiff as Executive Secretary. Plaintiff has 
not set forth any other evidence that suggests that her transfer was motivated by discriminatory 
animus because she is female.17 This raises no issue of fact with regard to pretext as it relates to 
Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination based on her gender. In the absence of evidence favorable to 
Plaintiff on the issue of pretext, Plaintiff’s claim for gender discrimination must fall.
For these reasons, the Court must deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with 
respect to all of Plaintiff’s claims except Plaintiff’s claims for gender discrimination.18
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17 As noted above, Plaintiff has not established aprima facie case of gender 
discrimination with respect to her termination because the employees who took over her job 
responsibilities were also female.
18 The Court recognizes that if  Plaintiff is able to demonstrate that Defendant’s 
proffered legitimate reasons are pretextual, Defendant may prevail by establishing a mixed- 
motive defense. See Pennington, 261 F.3d at 1269. To prevail on this defense and avoid liability 
for Title VII retaliation, an employer must prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
decision would have been made the same in the absence of discrimination.” Steger v. General 
Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 2003); Pennington, 261 F.3d at 1269. The Court need 
not address the mixed-motive defense at this point however, because it finds that genuine issues 
of material fact exist which require the case to be presented to a jury.
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CONCLUSION
______ Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [D.E. 31, 32] is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND 
DENIED IN PART. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to 
Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims set forth in Counts X and XI. Defendant’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment is DENIED with respect to all other counts.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida this 30th day of March, 2010.
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United States Magistrate Judge
cc: counsel of record
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